I estimate the welfare provided by and net costs of the Medicare HMO program in 1999-2002. I measure welfare with a nested logit model of demand for Medicare HMO plans using detailed data on plan benefits. From this, I derive estimates of consumer surplus and find that total welfare provided by the program over the four-year period is about $61 billion (2000 $). I also use data on favorable selection enjoyed by Medicare HMOs to estimate net costs, which total about $21 billion (2000 $). Net welfare therefore totals nearly $40 billion and the return on spending is about 186%.
Introduction
The Medicare managed care program, in which commercial plans contract with the government to provide health insurance for Medicare beneficiaries, has existed in one form or another since 1972. In 1982, it took its modern form, where the government reimburses the plans a flat rate per month, and the plan bears the financial risk of providing insurance (Zarabozo 2000) . Typically, the plans provide a more generous benefit package than that offered under traditional or fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare which probably partly explains why enrollees in Medicare private plans spend less than half out of pocket on health care than Medicare beneficiaries without any supplemental coverage at all (Neuman et al. 2007 ). Many of the plans charge enrollees a premium and, unlike FFS Medicare but like commercial managed care plans, restrict which doctors and hospitals enrollees can use and restrict what care an enrollee can receive.
The Medicare managed care program has caused controversy, however, because it raises the net cost of Medicare. The original goal of the program was to lower spending on Medicare by taking advantage of the managed care plans' supposed greater efficiency in providing insurance to beneficiaries. Because payments to the plans are only partly risk-adjusted, however, and because beneficiaries who choose managed care are in better health on average than those who stay in FFS Medicare, beneficiaries who enroll in a Medicare managed care plan end up costing more to the government than they would have if they had stayed in FFS Medicare. The program still seems to be valuable to beneficiaries, however, since, when many plans withdrew from the program earlier this The return on government spending on the program is then calculated as the total welfare provided by the program divided by the net cost minus one. Total welfare is defined as counterfactual welfare (or welfare provided by FFS Medicare) subtracted from actual welfare provided by the Medicare HMO program. Since, in the demand model, however, the utility derived from being enrolled in FFS Medicare is normalized to zero, counterfactual welfare is also zero, so total welfare is simply equal to the welfare provided by the program. Over the four-year period, total welfare is about $61 billion (in 2000 dollars) and total net costs are about $21 billion; the program therefore provides net welfare of about $40 billion and the return on spending on the Medicare managed care program in this period is therefore about 186%.
The Medicare managed care program therefore not only provided positive net welfare and gave a positive return but the return was fairly high. Policymakers may wish to take this return into consideration when they decide to make changes to the program. The analysis presented here should be viewed in light of some caveats, however. First, it does not rule out that other policy options may deliver an even higher return. Second, in the years 1999 through 2002, the only plans available in the Medicare managed care program were health maintenance organizations (HMOs). Since the Medicare Modernization Act in 2003, however, the types of plans available in the Medicare Advantage program (as it was renamed) expanded to include preferred provider organizations (PPOs) and private fee-for-service plans. The private FFS plans may raise net costs more than the other types of plans as their payments tend to be higher (CBO 2007) , which may lower the overall return on the program.
In measuring the welfare provided by the Medicare managed care program, I take an approach close to that of Town and Liu (2003) who estimate the welfare provided by the Medicare HMO program in 1993 through 2000 also using a nested logit model applied to market share data to estimate demand. This paper builds on that analysis in the following ways.
First, I take advantage of several datasets that were not available to Town and Liu (2003) . One dataset I use has highly detailed data on the level of prescription drug benefits and on nondrug benefits. Town and Liu (2003) had no data on benefits available other than a dummy for whether or not the plans offered prescription drug benefits. I also use county-level data on per capita FFS spending and on the average risk factors of both FFS beneficiaries and Medicare HMO enrollees in order to estimate the net cost of the program. These data give direct information on the counterfactual costs of Medicare HMO enrollees for the exact counties and years under study.
Other changes in approach I make include using a more flexible nesting structure than Town and Liu (2003) did, that allows for correlation in utility across all managed care choices. I also instrument for premium with the premiums of competitors rather than the plan's own premiums, as using the plan's premiums may not be appropriate in the Medicare HMO context.
Taken together, these differences in approach give significantly different results for the welfare provided by and the net costs of the Medicare HMO program for the two years for which this paper and Town and Liu (2003 ) overlap (1999 . In their paper, consumer surplus for both years sums up to $8.3 billion, while spending on the program varies from net costs of $13.2 billion to a savings of $4.4 billion depending on their assumption about how much favorable selection Medicare HMOs experience. The results of their paper therefore range from the Medicare HMO program delivering a return of -37% to it delivering a simple benefit of $12.7 billion. I find, however, that consumer surplus in 1999 and 2000 sums up to $33.6 billion and net costs sum up to $12.6 billion, suggesting a return of 167% in those two years. runs Medicare, to provide health insurance for Medicare beneficiaries within a defined service area (for HMOs, a county or group of counties). The contract, which is revised and renewed each year, specifies benefits to be provided and possibly a premium that will be charged by the plan to the beneficiary, above the Medicare Part B premium which the beneficiary continues to pay. During the period studied here, the government reimbursed the plan at a flat rate that was set at a base level by county and then adjusted for the individual beneficiary's age, sex, Medicaid eligibility status, and employment status. The flat rate passed the financial risk of the beneficiary's medical care to the plan. Beneficiaries could enroll in the private plans or remain in FFS Medicare as they choose and were allowed to switch in and out of FFS Medicare or among plans whenever they want. The plans must either accept all Medicare beneficiaries as enrollees or close the plan completely.
The advantage of the managed care plans for the beneficiary is that they require less cost-sharing. Co-payments for doctor visits, for example, are usually about $10-$15 per visit, which is less than the 20% co-insurance required by FFS Medicare. Medicare managed care plans also often cover benefits that are not covered by FFS Medicare such as preventive care, vision care, dental care, and outpatient prescription drugs, which There is evidence that strongly suggests that beneficiaries who choose to enroll in Medicare managed care plans are in better health and therefore have expected lower health-care spending on average than the beneficiaries who stay in FFS Medicare. Several studies, using Medicare claims data, have found that beneficiaries who enroll in Medicare HMOs had lower health-care spending before enrolling than beneficiaries who chose to remain in FFS Medicare (Cox and Hogan 1997 , GAO 1986 , Morgan et al. 1997 , Thiede et al. 1999 . Estimates of the spending of beneficiaries who later join HMOs as a percent of the spending of beneficiaries who remain in FFS Medicare ranged from 63 percent to 71 percent. Other studies, using the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey or other surveys, find that HMO enrollees have better self-reported health status and fewer impairments (Brown et al. 1993 , Banthin and Taylor 2001 , Atherly et al. 2004 , Mello et al. 2003 .
The most comprehensive and up-to-date evidence on this question is provided by Greenwald et al. (2000) . In early 2000, CMS implemented a method for risk adjusting payments to Medicare HMOs by modelling each beneficiary's expected health care spending as a function of their demographics and inpatient diagnoses in the previous year.
The resulting risk factor is calculated as the ratio of the individual's beneficiary expected health care spending to the average expected health care spending of a beneficiary enrolled in the FFS program. Greenwald et al. (2000) compare the average risk factors of FFS Medicare beneficiaries with Medicare HMO enrollees for all counties with Medicare HMOs calculated based on inpatient data from 1997-98. They find that, in the median county, the average risk factor of HMO enrollees is nearly 14 percent below the average risk factor of beneficiaries in FFS Medicare and that the vast majority of counties have favorable selection in the managed care population to some degree. 
A model of demand for Medicare HMO benefits
To estimate the welfare provided by the extra benefits of Medicare HMO plans and by the lower out-of-pocket spending of Medicare HMO enrollees, I first estimate a structural model of demand for Medicare HMO benefits. Berry (1994) showed that, by inverting the function relating market shares to utility, it is possible to estimate ordinary and nested logit models of demand using linear regressions on aggregate data. The example he used was a two-level model where the choices are grouped exhaustively into G groups, other than one choice which is referred to as the "outside" choice and for which consumer surplus is normalized to zero.
Town and Liu (2003) sort the HMOs into two nests by whether or not they offer prescription drug benefits while defining remaining in FFS Medicare as the outside choice. A potential problem with their approach, however, is that, intuitively, we would expect all the managed care choices to be nested together since managed care plans have many features in common, such as limited provider choice, demand for which is probably correlated across plans for the same individual.
I therefore nest all the managed care choices together. In addition, like Town and Liu, I nest them within that nest by whether or not they offer prescription drug benefits.
Utility of individual i for plan j in this model is given by:
X j consists of the observed characteristics of the choices, and ξ j is a scalar measuring the quality of the choice observable to the consumer, but not to the econometrician.
These together make up δ j , which is the part of utility that is the same for choice j across individuals. Each individual also has a random draw of utility θ iHM O for the managedcare nest, a random draw of utility ζ ig for each prescription-drug nest g, and a draw ǫ ij for each plan. Each individual chooses the plan j that gives them the maximum utility.
The parameters σ 1 and σ 2 (both ∈ (0, 1)) measure the correlation in unobserved utility across choices in the same nest. As the parameters approach one, within-nest substitution is stronger than across-nest substitution. σ 1 measures the correlation in unobserved utility across all the managed-care choices and σ 2 measures the correlation in unobserved utility across the plans within the two prescription-drug nests.
The estimating equation for this model is derived as follows. (The derivation is similar to Berry's for the two-level model.) The share of plan j within prescription-drug nest g is given by:
= exp(
The share of nest g within the HMO group is in turn given by:
Finally, if we normalize δ 0 to 0, the share of the HMO group is given by:
And the share of the outside choice (FFS Medicare) is given by:
The unconditional share of plan j is therefore:
Algebraic manipulation similar to Berry (1994) 's for the two-level model yields the following equation that can be used to estimate β, σ 1 , and σ 2 :
The difference between this equation and Berry (1994)'s equation for the two-level model is that Berry (1994) 's equation omits ln(s g|HM O ) as a regressor, forcing σ 1 to be 0.
If s g|HM O is correlated with X j , however, omitting it leads to inconsistent estimation of β and σ 2 . To test which is the preferred model, I will include ln(s g|HM O ); if the coefficient σ 1 is significantly different from zero, the estimates from the two-level model will be biased, and the three-level model would be more appropriate. Benefit and premium data come from the Medicare Compare database, which is the database underlying the online plan chooser for Medicare beneficiaries. All of these data sources were obtained from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the government agency that runs Medicare.
The enrollment data give enrollment by contract number within a county. One contract may, however, cover more than one package of benefits since HMOs are allowed to offer more than one within a county. Usually, the offerings consist of a "basic" plan with an optional supplement for an extra premium. Since enrollment is not split up by packages however, I attribute all of the enrollment to the HMO's "basic" plan, defined as the plan with the lowest premium. (Atherly et al. 2004 report that 87% of Medicare HMO enrollees with prescription drug coverage receive it through the plan's basic benefit package.)
The market share for each plan was calculated by dividing the plan's enrollment by the number of Medicare eligibles in the country, adjusted to reflect state-level rates of In addition to many HMOs dropping out of the program during this period, a further effect of reducing the reimbursement was that the HMOs who stayed in raised premiums faster than the rate of inflation and reduced coverage. Table 2 shows the average premiums If Medicare HMO plans offered prescription drug coverage, they could offer only cover-age of generic prescription drugs or also offer coverage for brand-name prescription drugs. If Medicare HMOs offered brand-name prescription drug coverage, they nearly always put a limit on that coverage. The Medicare Compare database also contains extensive information on the nondrug benefits of the plans. For the purposes of this paper, information about the following benefits were extracted: the co-payment for a primary care visit, the co-payment for a specialist visit, the inpatient deductible, whether or not the plan required a referral to see a specialist, whether or not it offered vision benefits and whether or not it offered dental benefits.
As Table 2 shows, both of the average doctor visit co-payments increased slightly between 1999 and 2002: the primary care co-payment from about $8 to about $10, and the specialist co-payment from about $9 to $15. The average deductible for inpatient hospital stays more than sextupled during the same period, from $21 to $132. The percentage of plans that do not require a referral to see a specialist is very small but rises noticeably in 2002.
The plans also have the option of offering vision and dental benefits above the level of FFS Medicare. FFS Medicare's vision benefits only cover exams for glaucoma for high-risk patients, and glasses following cataract surgery. The HMOs typically cover routine eye exams and/or glasses and contact lenses. FFS Medicare has almost no dental coverage, while the HMOs, if they offer dental coverage, cover from one to an unlimited number of preventive dental exams. Since information about vision and dental coverage was sometimes incomplete, however, I only control for whether they offer each kind of coverage, not what the level of coverage is. As Table 2 shows, most plans offer vision benefits and the percentage of plans offering vision benefits declines only slightly, from 93% in 1999 to 85% in 2002. The percentage of plans offering dental benefits more than halves, from 32% in 1999 to 14% in 2002.
Empirical strategy
As discussed in Section 3, the regression to be estimated is:
where s is the plan's market share, p is the plan's monthly premium, j indexes the plan, m indexes the county and t indexes the year (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) . X jmt is a vector of benefit characteristics. s 0mt is the share of FFS Medicare in the county.
ξ jmt contains characteristics of the plan that are unobserved by the econometrician but are observed by the beneficiaries and affect their valuation of the plan. Among other things, it might include the extensiveness and quality of the HMO's provider network.
These unobserved characteristics are correlated with premium, the log of the plan's share within its nest (ln(s j|gmt )), and the log of the nest's share within the total HMO share of the market (ln(s g|HM Omt )). In order to partially overcome this problem, I use plan-county fixed effects which capture the plan-county mean quality ξ jm and leave the time-specific deviation in plan quality ∆ξ jmt as the error term. This strategy for dealing with the correlation between price and unobserved quality is very similar to that of Hausman (1997) and Nevo (2001) . The only potential remaining inconsistency in estimation therefore would arise from factors that change over time for a given plan in a given county that affect both their premium and conditional shares, and demand for their product.
To deal with this remaining concern, the premium, the log of the plan's share within Competitors' premiums in other counties are, however, correlated with the premium of the observation through the components of marginal cost common across the region.
In using competitors' premiums, this paper differs from most previous work in this area, which use the firm's own prices in other geographic regions as instruments rather than competitors' prices (Hausman 1997 , Nevo 2001 . The assumption behind using the firm's own prices is that shocks to marginal cost will be reflected in the firms' prices across counties. That strategy requires, however, the assumption that the different regions'
deviations from the mean valuation of the same good be independent of each other. This assumption can be justified in the case where regions are geographically separated from each other and the good that is being sold is identical across regions (as in the case of ready-to-eat cereal being sold in different cities across the US, as in Hausman [1997] and
Nevo [2001] ). Medicare HMOs, however, tend to operate in a group of counties that are contiguous and beneficiaries are likely to be crossing over county boundaries to receive their medical care. In this case, the time-specific deviations from the means of quality in each county are not going to be independent of each other in adjacent counties for the same plan, limiting the applicability of the type of instrument used in previous work. I therefore use competitors' premiums, as described above.
The other instrument for premium is the base reimbursement rate for the county since that is an exogenous determinant of price. The reimbursement rate is set by legislation and is the same for all plans within a county.
To instrument for the logs of the conditional shares, I use functions of the characteristics of other firms in the same market. These variables will capture the part of the firm's share of its nest that is determined by other firms' behavior but not the part that is set by the firm's own characteristics. The instruments for the plan's share within its drug/non-drug nest are therefore the means of the brand-name drug coverage amount and the means of the non-drug benefits offered by competing plans in the same drug/non-drug nest in the same county. If there are no other plans in the same drug/non-drug nest, these are set to zero. The instruments for the drug/non-drug nest's share of the overall HMO share are the means of the same variables for the plans in the other drug/non-drug nest within the same county. If there are no plans in the other nest, these are also set to zero.
In the demand regressions, drug benefits are specified both with a simple dummy for the plan offering drug benefits and with a more detailed specification of drug benefits.
The first specification allows direct comparison with other studies with less detailed drug benefit data, such as Town and Liu (2003) . The second specification includes a dummy for generic prescription drug coverage, the brand-name prescription drug coverage amount, and the brand-name prescription drug coverage amount squared. The coverage amounts are deflated to 2000 levels using the Consumer Price Index for prescription drugs.
Finally, dummy variables for years are included to control for yearly shifts in demand for HMOs and their associated medical care. When we compare the results for the three utility specifications (logit, two-level nested logit, and three-level nested logit), we see that, since σ 1 is estimated to be .5 in the threelevel nested logit model (when drug benefits are specified in detail) with a standard error of .1, this latter model is the preferred one. This model allows beneficiaries' utility functions to be correlated across all managed-care choices. The positive and significant estimate for σ 1 means that failing to allow for this correlation will lead to the estimates of the effects of the benefits being inconsistent, and that we should therefore focus on the results from the three-level nested logit.
Demand results
The estimated effects of the benefits mostly have the expected sign, with the exception of the dummy for generic coverage which is weakly negative. The remaining benefits mostly have estimated effects that are significant; the exceptions are the two doctor visit co-payment variables, and the dummy for dental benefits.
To make the magnitudes of the effects shown in Table 3 clearer, Table 4 translates the marginal utilities given in Table 3 into willingnesses to pay by dividing the marginal utilities of the benefits by the marginal utility of income as estimated by the coefficient on premium. Table 4 gives the results of this calculation for the three models (ordinary logit, two-level nested logit, and three-level nested logit), both specifications of drug benefits, and for the nondrug benefits in the equations where drug benefits are specified in detail.
Since the premium was deflated to 2000 dollars in the demand regressions, the estimates of the willingnesses-to-pay are therefore also in 2000 dollars.
While the differences across the equations are generally not significant, the point estimates of the effect of drug benefits drop noticeably in the three-level model. The marginal willingness to pay for a drug benefit is estimated to be about $14 in the two- There is little information or other estimates to which these estimates can be compared, or against which they can be benchmarked. The response to the primary care co-payment can be characterized as strong, since a willingness to pay $1 per month to reduce the primary care co-payment by $1 implies that, if beneficiaries are rational, they are visiting their primary care doctors once a month on average. According to the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, however, the median number of visits to the doctor made by Medicare beneficiaries is six per year, or one every other month (Kaiser Family Foundation 2005) .
It is hard to know why enrollees are reacting so strongly to the primary care co-payment;
it is possible that they are overreacting to it simply because it is usually listed first in the output of the Medicare Compare database. For the other benefits, there is little to benchmark the estimates of their effects against.
Beneficiary welfare provided by the Medicare HMO program
The next section uses the demand function estimated in the previous section to calculate the consumer welfare provided by the Medicare HMO program from 1999 to 2002. As Small and Rosen (1981) show, surplus per consumer in a market in a discrete-choice model is found by integrating over the share function. Intuitively, this result is analogous to the result for continuous choice that compensating variation is found by integrating over the compensated demand function. For a representative consumer, the compensating variation of a change either in the number of choices available, or their characteristics is given by:
δ 0 is the vector of mean utilities from the choices available before the change and δ 1 is the same vector after the change. As Small and Rosen (1981) show, this integral can be applied to multiple changes in choice characteristics or in the number of choices at once.
If we integrate the share formula for the three-level nested logit model (equation 6) in this way, we obtain:
where, as in equation (2), (10) 
Estimated aggregate welfare is given in the last row of Briefly, my method is to take the average amount spent per beneficiary in the FFS program (reported by CMS for each county), adjust it for favorable selection with regard to health status in the Medicare managed care program, and sum it up over counties for each year; the details follow.
The adjustment for favorable selection is made by taking the ratio of the average risk factor of managed care enrollees to the average risk factor of FFS Medicare beneficiaries in each county. The risk factor is calculated by CMS for each Medicare eligible and is the ratio of that eligible's expected spending to the average spending of Medicare beneficiaries.
The calculation of the risk factor and the model of spending it is based on until 2003 are described in detail in Ingber (2000) and Pope et al. (2000) . Briefly, CMS predicts spending as a function of each beneficiary's demographics and inpatient diagnoses (if available) for the previous years.
As Greenwald et al. (2000) point out, the ratio of the average risk factor of managed care enrollees to the average risk factor of FFS Medicare beneficiaries may therefore serve as a measure of the amount of favorable selection that Medicare managed care plans experience, as it is an estimate of the ratio of managed care enrollees' spending to FFS Medicare beneficiaries' spending. Greenwald et al. (2000) cite their finding that the risk factors of Medicare HMO enrollees are lower on average than those of beneficiaries in FFS Medicare as evidence for favorable selection in the Medicare managed care program. Medicare HMO enrollees in these counties was about .9 and the mean average risk factor for Medicare FFS beneficiaries was about .97, making the ratio of the two just above .9.
In other words, the average Medicare HMO enrollee had a risk profile such that they were expected to cost just over 90% as much as the average Medicare FFS beneficiary. Table 8 shows the calculation of counterfactual Medicare FFS spending adjusting for favorable selection using the ratios of the risk factors for the two categories of Medicare Tables 7 and 8 Table 8 . In the absence of data on risk factors for 2002, however, I will merely note that the results on costs for that year are less reliable than those for the other three years.
9 Net welfare of the Medicare HMO program and the return on government spending on the program in 1999-2002 Table 10 combines the results of the welfare analysis as reported in Table 5 and the calculations of the net cost in Table 9 to give an estimate of the net welfare provided county. This increase would almost certainly raise the net cost of the program as it is highly unlikely that the ratio of private plan enrollees' costs to those of FFS beneficiaries would have risen above one, even though private plan enrollment increased as a share of total Medicare enrollment. On the other hand, the entry of plans into the program and more generous benefits would raise the welfare generated by the program. Recently, the plans' payment rates were cut again, which may have effects on entry and plan benefits opposite to those of the Medicare Modernization Act. Without data on the benefits being offered, however, it is not possible to estimate the return on government spending for the Medicare Advantage program currently. Premium, log(plan share | group share), and log(group share | HMO share) are instrumented. Instruments for premium include the weighted average of competitors' premiums in other counties in the plan's service area and the county reimbursement rate. The instruments for log(plan share | group) are the average covered drug expenditure and the averages of the nondrug benefits of other plans in the same drug/nondrug group. The instruments for log(group share | HMO) are the average covered drug expenditure and the averages of the nondrug benefits of plans in the other drug/nondrug group in the same county. The premiums, co-payments, and deductibles were deflated to 2000 levels with the CPI for all items. The brand-name drug coverage amount was deflated to 2000 levels All regressions include year effects and plan-county fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and are calculated by the formula for fixed-effects Market shares for plans and for traditional Medicare have been adjusted to reflect that beneficiaries enrolled in Medicaid or an employer-sponsored supplemental retirement plans are not counted among those eligible for a Medicare HMO. Table 3 
